Abstract. This paper tests the behavioral equivalence of a class of strategicallyequivalent mechanisms. In addition to strategic-equivalence, the mechanisms also do not differ in terms of their procedures. In a private value setting, we introduce a family of mechanisms, so-called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which will then be multiplied by α to calculate the bids in the auction. When α = 1, Mechanism (α) is the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. We show that for any (α), individuals' bid functions should be identical across mechanisms. We conduct a laboratory experiment to test the behavioral equivalence of this class of mechanisms under different values of α. Even though the procedure and environment do not change across auctions, we do not observe outcome-equivalence across these strategically-equivalent mechanisms. Our research can inform mechanism design literature with respect to the design of optimal mechanisms.
Introduction
Mechanism design is the modern economic analysis of institutions and markets. It has changed the way economists think about optimal institutions when governments are unaware of individual preferences. In the mechanism design literature, the focus is on designing optimal mechanisms (Jackson 2001; Jackson 2003) . For example, designing the optimal mechanism is an extremely important problem in the auction literature, where the objective is to increase efficiency by ensuring the object goes to the bidder with the highest value. Experimental research has been helpful in testing whether constructed mechanisms generate the predicted outcomes (Chen and Ledyard 2008;  McFadden 2009).
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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether seemingly equivalent mechanisms generate the same outcomes in a laboratory setting. Discovering of this issue is crucial, since the mechanism design theory is a standard toolkit for many economists and has affected virtually all areas of policy including regulation, auctions, and environmental
policy. An important finding in this literature is that theoretically outcome-equivalent mechanisms do not necessarily lead to the same outcome (Kagel 1995 2 Note that strategic equivalence is stronger than outcomeequivalence since for every strategy in the Dutch auction, there is another strategy in the first-price auction which results in the same outcome; hence one could be tempted to conclude that both auction formats are identical.
While these results are initially striking, one might argue that these are fundamentally different institutions. They differ in the way that they are implemented: the Dutch auction is progressive and open, while the first-price auction is static and sealed (Vickrey 1961; Krishna 2002) . Indeed, these procedural differences are vital for an 1 In particular, experiments were helpful in testing auctions (Kagel 1995 Lucking-Reiley (1999) shows that these auctions are not revenue equivalent in a field setting.
agent whose risk preference is outside of the standard expected utility model. Even though these institutions are strategically-equivalent, the revenue equivalence result holds only when the agents are expected utility maximizers (Karni 1988 ).
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The novelty of this paper is to design and experimentally contrast mechanisms that share exactly the same structure/procedure and are strategically-equivalent. In contrast to earlier studies, the risk preferences of agents are not important in this class of mechanisms. We consider an auction environment with a single indivisible object and buyers with independent private values. We introduce a class of mechanisms, so called Mechanism (α), that generalizes the standard first-price sealed bid auction. In Mechanism (α), buyers are asked to submit a value which will then be multiplied by α to calculate the bids in the auction. As in the first-price sealed-bid auction, the buyer with the highest bid gets the good and pays her/his bid. Note that, in equilibrium, the "calculated bids" in the Mechanism (α) are identical for any α. In addition, Mechanism (α) has the same structure under different α's with a small change in how the outcome function translates the values to the bids. Therefore, this family of mechanisms are outcome-equivalent without the need for particular assumptions, such as on risk preferences.
We use the first-price sealed-bid auction as our base mechanism. There are two reasons for this choice. First, the first-price sealed-bid auction is commonly used both in the mechanism design literature and in the real world. Second, we can construct an environment with exactly the same structure across auctions. As a further control to keep the environment same, we provide a "bid calculator" to the subjects so that in all mechanisms calculating the bids (transformations of submitted values to bids)
does not create any additional complexity to the auctions than would be inherited by the standard first-price auction. This is in line with Jackson (2001) who argues that complexity may explain why some outcome-equivalent mechanisms do not perform the same way.
In order to address the question of whether individuals behave equivalently in these strategically-equivalent mechanisms, we run an experiment considering three treatments: Mechanism (0.9), Mechanism (1), and Mechanism (1.1), where Mechanism (1) corresponds to the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. We pick α's close to 1 on
For both the first-price and Dutch auctions, Nakajima (2011) characterizes an equilibrium when bidders have non-expected utility preferences, particularly exhibiting the Allais paradox.
purpose to keep the mechanisms as similar as possible. In addition, we pick α's symmetrically around 1 so that the behavioral differences will not be attributed to the distance from the standard first-price auction.
In contrast with what theory predicts, we do not observe outcome-equivalence. We establish the following conclusions: (i) we find that the subjects bidding behavior differed most notably between Mechanism (0.9) and Mechanism (1), where those participating in Mechanism (0.9) shaved their bids by approximately 5%, and (ii) the revenue equivalence does not hold; the standard first-price auction generated higher revenue than the Mechanism (0.9)-subjects who participated in Mechanism (0.9) earned approximately 20% more compared to Mechanism (1).
Our findings provide new challenges for the auction theory as well as the mechanism design theory in general. In order to design optimal mechanisms, one needs to consider the behavioral aspects of mechanisms. The behavioral anomalies might then be taken into account to provide better theories and more efficient mechanisms. The next section describes the Mechanisms (α) and shows the correspondence between the first-price sealed-bid auction. In Section 3, experimental design and procedures are explained.
Section 4 presents the data analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Mechanism (α)
There It is easy to see that this family of mechanisms are identical and outcome-equivalent independent of bidders' risk preferences. Assume that there exists an equilibrium in the standard first-price auction (α = 1). For any α > 0, 1 α times the original strategy will generate an equilibrium with the same outcome in Mechanism (α). In other words, if there is no incentive to unilaterally deviate from the equilibrium when α = 1, then no one would gain by deviating unilaterally from the described equilibrium in Mechanism (α). Now, for the illustration purposes, we derive the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy when bidders are assumed to have the same von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.) with u(0) = 0, u > 0 and u ≤ 0.
4 Given α > 0, assume all other players j = i follow symmetric, increasing and differentiable equilibrium strategy S α : V → V .
Bidder i is facing a trade off between the winning probability and the gain of winning.
Bidder i's maximization problem is:
At a symmetric equilibrium, s = S α (v i ). Together with the first order condition, this gives
where
If agents have Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility functions with risk aversion coefficient equal to 1 − r, the unique symmetric equilibrium strategy is:
In equilibrium, the submitted-value function, given by equation (2.2), multiplied with α gives the calculated-bid function. Therefore, it is easy to see that the bids are no longer a function of α and therefore, Mechanism (α) generates the same bid function regardless of the α. That is,
In addition, note that, α = 1 corresponds to the standard first-price sealed-bid auction.
Experimental Procedure
The experiments were performed in the RCGD experimental lab at the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan during September 2011. 5 Subjects were recruited from the students of the university (through the ORSEE recruitment program which sends an E-mail to all university students who are enrolled to the program).
4 Homogeneity assumption simplifies the illustration of the model, however, our results are independent of it, as shown in Appendix B.
5 Pilot experiments were run at New York University at the CESS Laboratory. Table 1 . Experimental Design
In the three treatments, we chose mechanisms with different α's corresponding to the different treatments. Notice that the Mechanism (1) is simply a first-price sealed-bid auction. Mechanism (0.9) and Mechanism (1.1) are both theoretically equivalent to Mechanism (1), but we would like to see whether they are behaviorally equivalent as well.
In our experiment, participants were seated individually in visually isolated cubicles with computers in front of them. Then, they received instructions on the computer screen (see Appendix A). Instructions were also read aloud in order to make sure that the information was common knowledge. We follow a between subjects design, so each subject participate in only one of the treatments. Subjects were told that there would be 20 rounds and each period, they would be randomly re-grouped with 3 other people in the room without knowing the identities of these people. In each period the value of the object for each subject was determined by a random number generator program in front of them. The values were between 1 and 100 where every number of two decimal places was equally likely. 6 At each period, subjects viewed a screen that showed their value and contained three sections: a "bid calculator" for testing submitted values, 7 a "value submission" section where submitted values were to be entered, and a history sheet indicating results from previous rounds. The subject with the highest calculated bid, which was equal to the submitted value multiplied with the α corresponding to that treatment, won the object in his/her group. The profit of the winner was determined by the difference between his/her value and the calculated bid. In all treatments, the winner was determined randomly with equal probability in case of a tie. At the end of each round, subjects could view the outcome of the auction (whether they won and their profit in points) and review their submitted value and calculated bid.
The main aim of this paper is to see if there is any behavioral difference between these theoretically equivalent mechanisms. We designed the experiment in such a way that the mechanisms are not complicated. Some may argue that any behavioral difference may be attributed to the difference in the complexity of the mechanisms, i.e., the reason for different outcomes could be simply because the subjects failed to recognize the equilibrium of the new game due to its complexity; however, complications of this sort are prevented with the use of the "bid calculator." Also, notice that the Mechanisms (0.9) and (1.1) are not complicated in the sense that if one can solve the equilibrium in the first-price sealed-bid auction then one can solve it in these mechanisms as well. 
Results
As we have demonstrated earlier, for any α 1 and α 2 not equal to zero, the Mech- Bid i = β 0 + β 1 value i + β 2 value 2 i + u i . 8 We do not expect Mechanisms (0.9) and (1.1) to have different levels of complexity even if one argues Mechanism (1) has less cognitive load. 9 Throughout the paper we cluster observations at the session level.
We cannot reject the null hypothesis that β 2 equals to zero in all treatments at 5% level, which provides support for linearity of the bid function.
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Next, for each mechanism, we regress bids on values and a constant term (see Table   2 ); we find that the slope (robust standard error) of the estimated bid function of the Mechanism (1) 
The associated p-value for β2 is 0.277 for Mechanism (1), 0.223 for Mechanism (0.9), and 0.202 for
where D i is equal to 1 if data point is coming from the Mechanism (0.9), 0 otherwise. We reject that the two bid functions have the same slope coefficients at 5% level (p − value = 0.022). We also repeat the same regression without a constant and we still conclude that the interaction term is significantly different than zero (p − value = 0.008). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the estimated bid functions are the same.
Pair-wise comparisons of the regressions show that the estimated bid function of the Mechanism (1.1) is significantly different (at the 5% significance level) than the Mechanism (0.9), but is not significantly different from the Mechanism (1.0). Table 3 documents these findings. empirical anomaly suggests that one should be careful in picking the optimal mechanism even among the theoretically equivalent class of mechanisms.
11 The average earnings of the Mechanism (1.1) was 35.22, which is in line with the fact that the estimated bid function for subjects participating in this treatment was slightly less than those participating in Mechanism (1) but higher than those participating in Mechanism (0.9).
Time Trends. Testing for adjustments in bidding over time for each mechanism
is not only interesting but also necessary in order to conclude that these mechanisms differ. It may be the case that bidding behavior in Mechanism (0.9) is getting similar to the bidding behavior in the other mechanisms over time. We therefore repeat our regression analysis by adding one more explanatory variable, "iro," which is equal to the inverse of round. A nonlinear adjustment process is preferred over a linear adjustment process, since this allows for a rapid learning in the first rounds. 12 In any case, results do not depend on this specification. We get the same results if we instead add "round." Table 3 reports the coefficients of the regressions. The time trend coefficient is not significant in the Mechanism (1.1). In the Mechanism (0.9) and (1.0), the time trend coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% significance level. The negative time trend coefficient suggests higher bidding over time. However, we see that even if bids are increasing in Mechanism (0.9), subjects do not bid as aggressively as in Mechanism
(1). 12 See Kagel (1995, pages 521-523) for a discussion on this issue. 13 To see this compare the coefficients of value in the regressions: 0.909 with 0.859.
Bidding theory has been extended to agents with heterogeneous risk preferences (see Cox, Smith and Walker (1982 , 1983 , 1985 , 1988 Therefore, if subject pools are driven from the same population, then Mechanism (α)
generates the same bid function for any α. Therefore, in this section, we would like to test whether there is any evidence of systematic differences in risk preferences across treatments. If subjects in the Mechanism (0.9) are systematically less risk averse, then CRRAM model would explain the differences in the bidding behavior.
In part 2 of our experiment, we elicit individuals' risk preferences. The subjects were presented with 15 situations, each of which introduced the choice between a fixed payoff of a specific amount (the "safe choice") or a 50-50 lottery between a payoff of $4.00
and of $0.00. When the subjects submitted all of their choices, the computer randomly selected a situation for each subject, and they received the payoff from whichever option We use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon Rank Sum) test for each possible pair of treatments in order to test the hypothesis that the number of safe choices are the same against the alternative hypothesis that one treatment has systematically larger values. Table 4 presents the results. Since we cannot reject the hypothesis that the number of safe choices are the same across any pairwise comparisons, we can conclude that the behavioral differences cannot be consistently explained by the CRRAM model. 
Conclusion
We study the behavioral difference between strategically-equivalent mechanisms that share the exact same environment. In order to do this, we construct the Mechanism insufficient adjustment in Mechanism (1.1), which would imply a higher bid function, might simply be due to the small margin of earnings in that region. Individuals realize in an auction before and the frequency of gambling, which may all affect how individuals bid in auctions, and we do not find any significant differences (Kruskal-Wallis tests; p-values are 0.288, 0.164, 0.574, and 0.220, respectively). 15 Anchoring and adjustment is defined as different starting points yielding different actions, since adjustments are typically insufficient.
insufficient adjustment corresponds to very little earnings, so the adjustment is complete. We see this to our advantage since this shows that mechanisms are not different in their complexity, i.e., subjects are able to make full adjustments.
These findings open up a new research agenda for the mechanism design theory.
We provide strong evidence that the behavior of individuals is different even under strategically-equivalent mechanisms that are also procedurally the same. This is suggestive that while searching for the optimal mechanism, theory should incorporate the behavioral aspects of mechanisms. As such, these findings have overriding consequences for the parts of theory which relate to implementation and equivalence, including the Revelation Principle.
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. Please make sure your mobile phones are turned off to avoid interruptions during the meeting. This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. Your participation in this experiment is voluntary but we hope that you will also find the experiment interesting. You will be compensated for your participation. You will be given $7 for showing up. You can earn an additional amount of cash which will be distributed at the end of the experiment.
The instructions are simple and you will benefit from following them carefully.
Part 1
In the first part of the experiment there will be a series of auctions. In each round you will participate in an auction with three other participants, for a total of 4 people.
Between rounds the people in your group will change randomly. However, you will not know the identities of these people. There will be 20 rounds. In each round, your earnings will depend of your choice and the choices made by the 3 other people in your group. We use points to reward you. At the end of the experiment we will pay you 30 cents for each point you won.
In each round, a fictitious good will be auctioned and each of you will have different values for this good. Each round, your value for the good will be determined by a random number generator. The number will be between 1 and 100 where every number (of two decimal places) is equally likely.
At the beginning of Round 1 you will be shown your value for the good. You will participate in an auction for the good, where your final earnings will be the difference between your value and your bid if you win the auction. However, in this auction you will not directly submit a bid. Instead, you will be asked to enter a "submitted value"
for the good and a bid will then be calculated for you. You are allowed to enter a "submitted value" that is different from your actual value. The server will collect each participants "submitted value" from Round 1, and your "submitted values" will be multiplied by .9 to determine your calculated bid. For example, say your submitted value is 60, then a calculated bid of .9*60 = 54 will be submitted for you. Please note that each round a bid-calculator will be provided for you so you may test out different submitted values before you make your final decision.
The computer randomly forms groups of four participants. Within each group, the calculated bids will be compared. The results of Round 1 will then be displayed. You will be informed whether or not you held the highest calculated bid in your group.
Only those of you with the highest calculated bid in their group will get the good, and his/her earnings will be equal to the difference between his/her value and calculated bid. In the case of a tie, the winner will be determined randomly with equal probability.
If you are the winner, your earnings will be: Earnings = Your value for the good -.9 * your submitted value
If the highest calculated bid is not yours (or if you lose in the case of a tie), then you earn nothing in the auction. So, your earnings will be:
That will end Round 1, and then Round 2 will begin. The same procedure will be used for all 20 Rounds. After each round you will be able to see whether you have won the auction and your earnings in that round on your computer screen. Your final earnings at the end of the experiment will be the sum of earnings over the 20 rounds.
Remember that at the end of the experiment you will receive the show-up fee and your total points/earnings will be multiplied by 30 cents to calculate your final payment.
Part 2
You will now be presented with several Situations. Each Situation will present you with the choice between a Fixed Payoff of a specific amount, or a 50-50 Lottery between a payoff of $4.00 and of $0.00. When you have made all of your choices, the computer will randomly select a Situation, and you will receive the payoff from whichever option you selected. You will then be asked to answer questions from a quick and confidential survey.
Survey Questions
Please answer ALL of the questions in this brief survey as accurately as you can. All answers are confidential, and in fact your answers are linked only to your participant ID for today's experiment, and not your name or student ID.
1. What is you age in years? (Enter: Integer.) 
